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IN THE SUP.REME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
l{l~ILEDG·E URANil'l\l AND MINING· ~ 
CORPOR.A. TION and l(ENNETH J. l\Ic-
C()H~IICI~, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs.-
FEDERAL RESOURCES CORPOR.A-
TION and HE·CLA MINING COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
\ Ko. 9604 
STATEMENT OF Tll:BJ KIND OF CASE 
Tllis is an action (a) for an accounting of royal tie:-; 
o'ving fro1n defendant operators to plaintiffs, the owners 
of a royalty interest of a ~·2<;{-, of all gross proceeds fron1 
the sale of all ore" fron1 certain mining claims, (b) 
for judgment based upon the difference bet\veen the 
an1ount actually paid and the amount detern1ined to be 
due pursuant to the aeeounting, (c) for a declaratory 
judgn1ent as to royalties to be paid in the future. 
DISPOSITIOX IN LO'\TER COlTRT 
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs~ 
1notion 'vas that defendants be ordered to render an 
accounting to plaintiffs based upon 2% of the sales price 
actually received. The motion ''"as denied. 
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Defendants n1oved for sunnnary judgn1ent. Defend-
ants' 1notion \Yas that if raw ore was not sold, royalties 
should be based on the value of ·raw ore, or in the 
alternative that royalties should be based on the net 
proceeds of sale of concentrated ore after deducting 
processing charges. This rnotion was granted. The Court 
not only granted defendants' rnotion for summary judg-
ment, but also decreed that plaintiffs have and recover 
nothing by their suit .. 
RELIEF SOl~GHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs also seek judgment in their favor as a matter 
of la\v, or, that failing, a trial on the issues of the case. 
STATEMENT OF F A·CTS 
There is no extensive record upon which to base 
a statement of facts since the lower court's judgment 
was made after an unreported hearing on n1otions for 
su1nn1ary judgment, during \Yhich no evidence was intro-
duced and no admissions were n1adP. Judge Elle~tt stated 
that his ruling \Vas based •'some,vhat'' upon his personal 
knowledge of mining and milling practices derived from 
his employment with Kennecott Copper Con1pany as 
an accountant, prior to his becoming a Judge. The re-
ported portion of his comment on the subject was ''I am 
drawing somewhat on my experience of seven years 
dealing \vith people that shipped ore and checking their 
contracts" (Tr. 210). 
Insofar as error in granting defendants' tnotion for 
sunnnary· judgtnent is concerned, this statement of fact 
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3 
u1ight be baHed upon \vhat plaintiffs 'vould have p·roveu 
had they been pertnitted a trial. This is in aceordance 
\vith the rule set forth in 6 lJ!loore's Federal Practice 
2364 that the party moving for ~nurunary judg~nent has 
the burden of establishing the lack of triable issue. I-lo,,·_ 
ever, sinee plaintiffs also appeal fro1n failure of the 
court to grant plaintiffs' motion for sunnnary judgtnent, 
the facts stated are limited to those established by de-
fendants' admissions and ans"rers to interrogatories in 
the record. 
In 1953 various mining clailns containing uraniu1n 
and vanadiun1 known as the Radon Clailns ".,.ere located. 
The locators conveyed these clailns and reserved a roy-
alty of H15 per cent of all gross proceeds fron1 the sale 
of ore" (Tr 29). Plaintiffs' predecessors \Vl1 re assigned 
a 27c royalty (from this 15% royalty) by t\\yo successive 
assigntnents. The first assigninent incorrectly referred 
to the royalty as "net mill or smelter returns" rather 
than "gross proceeds of sale'' as originally reserved (Tr 
31). The next assignment described the royalty as "2% 
royalty from gross sales of all ore" (Tr 33) 'Yhich 
correctly paraphrased the initial reservation. In 1955, 
to perfect defendants' title to the c.lai1ns involved, and 
to clarify and make certain the terms of the reserved 
royalty, defendants' predecessor obtained a quitclaim 
deed from plaintiffs' predecessor and gave in return 
their letter specifying the royalty to be a" gross royalty." 
This agreement \vas drafted by the defendants 
through their attorney (Tr 96, 121). It is still in force 
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and governs past and future royalty payments. The 
exact language thereof is a.s follows: 
''Federal l~raniun1. c·orporation hereby ac-
knowledges and confirms to you that you are the 
owner of a royalty of tw'o percent (2%) of all of 
the gross proceeds from the sale of all ore from 
the lode 1nining claims listed above, the gross 
proceeds to include any bonuses or premiums 
upon the ores mined, but shall not include trans-
portation and development allowances puid or 
granted to the owners of said claims; it is further 
ackno,vledged that the aforesaid royalty of t'vo 
percent (:2%) of all gross proceeds, as above 
specified, shall be paid by the ore depot or pur-
chaser directly to you, or your heirs, executors, 
administrators, and assigns, care of 200 North 
Fourth East, Bountiful, Utah, or at such other 
place or address as you or your successors to this 
interest may designate in writing to the President 
of Federal Uranium Corporation." (Tr 49) 
Until 1958 defendants 1narketed unconcentrated ore 
by sales to both the AEC and lTranimn Reduction Com-
pany, a licensed buyer, (Tr 94, 1 ~3-162). Royalties dur-
ing this period "\vere based upon the gross proceeds, 
such gross proceeds being based upon a price schedule 
set forth in AEC ·Circular 5. (Tr 9-t, 1~3-16~). In 1958, 
however, despite the fact that AEC Circular 5 was to 
continue in effect untill\Iarch 31, 1962 so that any market 
for unprocessed ore based upon the Circular 5 price 
schedule continued to be readily available~ defendants 
without consulting plaintiffs, changed their 1narketing 
practices. Instead of selling the ore to lJRC upon deliv-
ery, defendants had r:R,C act a~ a cn~ton1 1nill and re-
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tained title to the ore until after it "\\"as concentrated . 
. A sale 'va~ then made to lTRC after milling. Defendant~ 
entered into t\vo agreements ",.ith URC to accomplish 
this, a custon1 milling agree1nent ('rr 70) and a sales 
agree1nent (Tr 87). 
The Inilling process does not break dO\\"ll the r:-aO-. 
contained in the ore, but rather eliminates tnost of the 
eountry rock and other in1purities. The processes of 
stnelting and refining which \vould eliminate the oxygen 
1nineralizer from the lT30 8 , leaving onJ~~ uranimn, ar(~ 
not involved, hut occur at a late·r stagr. lT30~ is contained 
in both unmilled and milled ore (Tr 37, Tr 70, reverse 
~ide). The lT30 8 content of the orP has al\\'"ays been the 
basis for the price paid to defendants for the uranimn 
eontent of the ore regardless of \vhether uneoncentra.ted 
or concentrated ore \\'"as sold. (Tr. 37, 88). 
By delaying the sale until after tnilling, instead of 
~elling unconcentrated ore, defendants obtained an incon1e 
tax advantage, in that dressed ore, being n1orP valuable_ 
1~ the basis for a greater depletion a.llo,vance. Defendant~ 
depleted the increased amount ( Tr. ±3, 92). 
When the sales a.rra.ngen1ent ",.a~ changed so that 
sales occurred after instead of before milling, defendant~ 
did not also change the royalty computation to reflect 
the increased gross proceeds, but continued to cotnpute 
the1n as if they had continued to make sales of unproces~­
ed ore based upon AEC ·Circular 5 guaranteed n1initnn1n 
pri(·e schedules (Tr. 43, 92). 
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Defendants have made royalty paYJnents only after 
the sales oeeurred. In fact, defendants have stockpiled 
in excess of 9000 tons \vithout any payment of royalty 
thereon ( Tr. 43, 92). 
Defendants have kept two sets of books, since they 
started selling dressed ore, one based upon actual sales 
price of the concentrated ore,· and the other, called "Cir-
cular 5 Basis Sheets,'' based upon a computed price that 
would have been received had unprocessed ore been sold 
under the price schedule itemize·d by AEC Circular 5. 
(Tr.170). Royalty payments to date have been computed 
upon the latter. ( Tr. 43, 92). Circular 3 expires ~larch 
31, 1962 ( Tr. 37). 
No accounting 'vhatsoever has been n1ade by defend-
ants as sought by plaintiffs' complaint. There has there-
fore been no accounting for uranium royalties; nor for 
vanadium royalties, although the ore contains vanadium 
(Tr. 163, 167); nor for part of the sales price of the ore, 
which defendants contend is "development allowance" not 
subject to royalty but which plaintiffs contend is part 
of the sales price (Tr. 88). 
ARGU~IENT ~J:..ti.L 
POINT I. ----;---- ff 
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTEnl~ 
PENDANT5' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
(a) The Sup·reme Co1.trt should not presunze the 
lower court's interpretation of the contract was correct. 
''The rule that the evidence and findings will 
be reviewed in the light most favorable to the de-
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ter1nination of the trial court doPs not apply to 
the interpretation of the language or legal effect 
of docmnents, nor to the application of principles 
of la\\", but only to questions of fact." 
Ellerbeck r. Iiau·s, 1 lJ. 2d 229, 265 P. ~d 404 
. ' 407. 
(b) The royalty provisiou is e:rpressly based upon 
1Jrocee.ds of sal c: au d e.rp re s."'·ly prolz ibits d erfu ctio ns. 'rhe 
royalty language "gross proeeeds from the sale of all 
ore," has four key ''"ords: gross, proceeds, Hale and ore. 
1. Gross. 
The pertinent definition by \\r ebster of ~'gross'' ~~ 
as follows: 
H·Consisting of an overall total exclusive of 
deductions (gross earnings, gross p,roduction ... ) 
-opposed to net.'' 
Webster's Third New International Dict~on­
ary (1961) 
"Gross'' has not needed definition by the courts ex-
cept as it is incidentally defined in cases arising out of 
the definition of ''net.'' 
In an old treatise on mining,~ Snyder nn ill.iues 1003, 
Section 1257, appears the following: 
H 1\IEANING OF 'NET PROCEED~S' as ap-
plied in the western states. - In the "\vestern 
states the practice has become almost universal, 
as applied to the royalties payable on ores mined 
and marketed from precious metal mines, to base 
the payments upon net proceeds, "~hich means 
generally the price received· on the sale of ore less 
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the smelter charges and railroad freights. Soine-
times it ineludes sampling charges, but never Inin-
ing charges, and very seldom wagon freight, unless 
the lease reads 'a certain percentage of the ore or 
net value of the ore delivered on the dump,' in 
which case, of course, only mining charges are 
excluded. In defining the meaning of 'net pro-
ceeds' the court of appeals of Colorado very clear-
ly states the position of the parties in the follow·-
ing 'vords : 'We are referred to a number of au-
thorities in 'vhich the definition is given of the 
'vords ~net proceeds.' ""\\r e need not specially no-
tice these authorities, because ''Te are in perfect 
agreement \vith them. The "Tords 'net proceeds,' 
as used in a contract, where their signification is 
not qualified or restricted by other words in the 
same contract, mean what remains of the gross 
proceeds after all expense and loss incurred in 
realizing them are deducted ... They have con-
fined the deductions to be made from the gross 
proceeds, in order that the result 1na~ ... be net pro-
ceeds, \vithin certain li1nits. They say that the 
royalties shall be paid 'on the net proceeds from 
all s1nelter and freight charges and mill returns.' 
These words are not well put together, but every 
miner and every person familiar with transactions 
involving leases of mining property lrnows exactly 
'vhat they mean. They n1ean that frsight charges 
and charges for treatment are to come out of the 
gross 1nill or s1nelter values, and ,, ... hat is left is the 
net proceeds." 
Snyder. a~ authority for this proposition, cites t\\ ... o cases, 
Malouey v. J.~o1:e, 11 Colo .. A.pp. :.?SS, 5~ P. 1029, 1030, and 
Yank r. llordeau.r, :23 J[ont. ~05, 58 P. 42, 45. 
The C~olorado Court says: 
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·'The \vords 'net proceeds', as used in a con-
traet, \\'"here there signification is not qualified 
or restrictP(l h~,. other "rords in the same contract, 
1nean "?hat ren1ains of the gross proceeds after 
all expense and loss incurred in realizing theut 
are deducted.'' 
The ~fontana Court says: 
~~The net proceeds of the ore after milling or 
reduction were to be equally divided. So the con-
tract provides. It is therefore apparent, ... that 
the expression 'net proceeds' was employed and 
understood as signifying the avails of the ore, less 
charges of milling and reduction only." 
It is clear fro1n these citations that the phrase~ 'gros~ 
proceeds'' 1neans the entire sum received from the sale. 
\vhile Hn(:lt proceeds'' tneans gross proceeds less exp·ense~ 
incurred in realizing such returns. 
The ph rase ''the gross proceeds realized" is used 
1n the ad valore1n assessment on mines. The value of 
Inetalliferous mines for assessment is based on the an-
nual net proceeds thereof, \Yhich phrase is defined as the 
gro~~ proceed~ less certain deductions, 'vhich deduction~ 
include 1nilling cost~. (59-5-8 UCA 1953) Under thi~ 
~tatute [~. S. Snzelting, Refining & lllining Conzpany v. 
Haynes, 111 lT. 172, 176 P. 2d 622, defined the phrase 
··the gros~ proceeds realized" as meaning the total 
a1nount of 1noney received from ores extracted from the 
tnining claims. 
It \Yill be extensively argued by the defendant~, and 
the lo\Yer court evidently concluded, that the parties in-
tended a "net smelter" or "net proceeds" royalty. If the 
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parties had so intended, they "\vould have said as much. 
Suunning up the above authorities, gross is the anti-
thesis of net and any deduction therefrom changes the 
gross to net. 
With no record at all upon which to base its ruling, 
the lo,ver court, in effect, rewrote the royalty provision 
to make it read, ''net proceeds fro1n the sale of all ore.'' 
2. Proceeds. 
The pertinent definition by vVebster of "4proceeds" is 
as follows: 
"What is produced by or derived from some-
thing (as a sale ... ) by way of total revenue: the 
total amount brought in : yield, returns.'' 
Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary (1961) 
By using ''proceeds," the parties provided that the 
royalty holders had no interest in the ore as such, but 
only a right to the money derived therefrom. In other 
words, the royalty holders do not own the ore itself, nor 
do they have the right to take a percentage of the ore in 
kind. It is not the type of royalty such as is sometimes 
found in an oil and gas lease where the royalty holder 
has the right to take 1/Sth of the production in kind. 
The right to royalty payments does therefore not 
arise until there are "proceeds." This is borne out by 
the practice of the defendants wherein they make royalty 
paYlnents only after the sale has occurred after stock-
piling and after processing. 
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With no rec.ord to support such a ruling, the lo"·~r 
court disregarded the \Vord '~proceeds'' and instead of 
basing the royalty upon the atnount received, based it 
upon the atnount that \vonld have been received had there 
been proceeds of sale at an earlier date 'vhen the ore 
'vas in its ra"· state. 
The court disregarded the \\'"ord "proceeds" and, in 
effect substituted therefor the v.rord '~value" in ruling 
that the accounting should be based upon the fair market 
value of ra\\· ore, despite the clear language of the con-
tract that royalty should be based on the actual a1nount 
received, rather than upon so1ueone 's opinion as to \\·hat 
the value of the ore "·as. Had the parties intended 
''value" they "rould have said so. 
The fact that '~value" "·a~ not intended i~ further 
emphasized by the additional language in the agreernent 
creating a royalt)·, "Therein it is provided that the royalty 
"shall be paid by the ore depot or purchaser directly to 
you'' ( Tr. 49). The purchaser of the ore need not be the 
one who did the milling, and a buyer other than one doing 
the milling, 'vould have no infor1nation upon which to 
base any deduction for milling, nor "rould he have any-
thing upon which to base a payment if the royalty were 
based upon ''value'' rather than actual price paid. 
The provision in the lo,ver court's smnmary judg-
ment that defendants pay part of the 1nilling cost also 
disregards the "'"ord ~~proceeds.'' The obligation to pay 
a portion of the milling charges presupposes an o'yner-
ship interest in the ore being rnilled, in order that there 
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he any logic in requiring a contribution toward the 1nilling 
eharge. rrhe royalty holders do not own the ore and a 
require·ment that they pay a processing charge requires 
the pay1nent by plaintiffs for the processing of defend-
ants' ore. 
The decision as to 'vhether or not the ore should he 
processed, by "Tho1n it should be processed, 'vhen it should 
be processed and the cost thereof is entirely within the 
control of defendants. The royalty holders are not parties 
to the 1nilling contract nor have they had any say "That-
soever relating to it. The language of the royalty provi-
sion indicates the parties contemplated that such deci-
sions should be made by defendants 'vho 'vere the oper-
ators of the enterprise. The language permits the royal-
ty holders to share in the result but not to dictate the 
method of arriving at that result. The royalty agreement, 
if construed as 'v-ritten, nevertheless provides protection 
to plaintiffs, in that the royalty holders can safely assume 
that defendants will so operate that the maximum return 
will be obtained, since that is to the advantage of both the 
producer and the royalty holder. But "Then the smnmary 
judgment allows deductions to he n1ade from the pro-
ceeds, the situation changes completely and such protec-
tion is lost. The effect of the lo,ver court's summary 
judgment is that it takes a'Yay fro1n the royalty holder~ 
the right to share in the ultimate result "Thile at the same 
time it leaves the important decisions as to 'vhether or 
not the ore should be processed, by 'vhom, ,yhen and at 
wha.t cost, entirely "Tithin the discretion of the defendants. 
I larl the royalty holders intended that something other 
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than the proceeds of the sale \Vould deter1nine the a1nount 
of royalt~, pay1nents, they \Vould have been interested in, 
and would have had provisions controlling the above rnen-
tioned factors. No such provisions were rnade because 
the parties intended the proceeds to deter1nine the 
atnount of royalty payments. 
3. Sale. 
The pertinent definition hy \\r ebster of "sale~' is as 
follo"rs: 
•· .1\ contract transferring the absolute or gen-
eral ov\rnership of property fron1 one person or 
corporate body to another for a price." 
Webster's Third N eu' International DicthJn-
ary (1961) 
r_rhere is no question that defendants retained title in 
themselves until after thP completion of the ore milling 
process. 
There \Yas no necessity to do so. The ra\\'" ore \\"as 
readily saleable under a price schedule based upon AEC 
Circular 5 and \\,.ill be so saleable untill\f arch 31, 1962. 
(Tr. 37). 
Defendants have designedly delayed the time of sale 
until after the ore has been processed so that it will 
have a higher sales price, resulting in greater ''proceeds 
of sale" or 4 'gross income" upon \\rhich a 23% income 
tax depletion allo\vance is based. This is under 26 U.S.-
C .. A .. 613 \Yhich allo·w·s percentage depletion of the "gross 
incon1e frorn mining.'' Both the depletion and the royalty 
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are based upon gross (proceeds or income) yet the de-
fendants are allo,ved by the summary judgment to in-
tentionally increase the gross and thus profit by increas-
ing the 23 'lo depletion, and at the same time not bear 
any resulting consequenee of increase of royalty as to the 
:2% royalty. 
Defendants even keep t'vo complete sets of books, 
one based upon sales prices actually received, which books 
they sho'v to the Internal Revenue, and the other based 
upon Circular 5 AEC· prices which have nothing to do 
'vith the sales price received, which set of books they 
sho'v to the royalty holders (Tr. 170). The lower court 
says this is entirely proper, despite the fact plaintiffs' 
royalty agree1nent provides that payments shall be based 
upon proceeds of sale. 
When Circular 5 expires on 1Iarch 31st of this year, 
there 'vill be no guaranteed n1inimun1 price for un-
processed ore (Tr. 37). There then 1nay or 1nay not be 
any market for such ore. If there is a market, it n1ay be 
at a much lo,Yer price than under Circular 5; the price 
will probably fluctuate, from ti1ne to time; and there ,viii 
probably be different prices depending on such factors 
as different buyers and sellers, different grades, and 
types of ores, certain(Y of availability, costs of 1nining, 
size of contracts, etc. Defendants have a contract 'vith 
Uraniu1n Reduction Company to ~ell eoncentrated ore 
for $8.00 per pound of lT30s contained therein fron1 April 
1, 1962 until December 31, 1966 ( Tr. 88 reverse side). The 
parties "rould hardly have intended that defendants could 
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receive proceeds of sale frotn such contract for a high, 
certain price, over a long tertn, and yet be obligated to 
pay royalties based upon a different market prire "rhieh 
1nay be non-existent, or depressed or fluctuating. On the 
other hand, they \vould not have intended that <:~xpired 
Circ.ular 5 prices would control. They intPnded that ac-
tual sales price would control. 
The lo\\·er court by the sutntnar~· judgntent leaves the 
ro~·alty holders without the right to claim royalties "rhen 
the ores are 1nined, but bases them upon the value at 
that tilne. If the royalty is to be re"\\rritten so that it has 
the effect of a royalty based upon value of ra\\· ore, then 
plaintiffs should have the right to insist upon a sale just 
as soon as the ore is mined. The lo\\rer court gave theu1 
no such right, and in fact expressly provided that de-
fendants "in their absolute judgment and discretion 1nay 
either sell raw ore in its natural state or process it or 
cause it to be processed prior to sale." 
4. Ore.. 
The complete definition by ,,.,. ebster of "ore" is a~ 
follows: 
"1a: a natural or native Inineral that can 
usually be profitably mined and treated for the 
extraction of any of its constituents (iron ore., 
copper ore) b: a source from which valuable mat-
ter is extracted e: an unrefined condition or ma-
terial 2 : Precious Metal." 
Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary (1961) 
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Concentrated ore cornes \vithin all of these defini-
tions. Definition la includes treat1nent. lb does not re-
quire that it be in its native state, and smelting and refin-
ing t-}xtractive processes have not occurred at the 1nilling 
stage. lc provides that the 1naterial is ore until it is re-
fined (refining occurs after the sale). 2 provides that 
even in the 1netalic state, \vhich \Y·ould not occur until 
after refining, that it \vould be ore. 
When the ore has been concentrated, it is sometimes 
referred to as '"concentrate.'' The lo"~er court based its 
entire judgment on the premise that concentrating the 
ore changes its form so that it is no longer "ore." 
.... ~s sho\vn above, the definitions of "ore" include 
concentrated ore. Like\vise the definitions of ''concen-
trate" show that "concentrate'' is included in the term 
Hore.'' 
The pertinent definition by \Y"ehster of the noun 
''concentrate" is as follo,vs: 
lS: 
''son1ething obtained by concentration: a con-
centration or concentrated substanre: as a: the 
l'Plnainder of dressed ore that contains the nlin-
eral sought.'' 
The pertinent definition of the verb '"concentrate" 
"'to rt1 nder less dilute or diffuse : . . . ( :2) : to 
separate dross fro1n (repeated concentrating of 
th t} o rp is neePssary) ( 3) : to free fron1 i1npuri-
t. '' 1es. 
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The pertinent definition of ~'dress" as used in the 
definition of ·~concentrate'' is: '"to free (as grain or ore) 
of irnpurities or irregularities." 
lVebster's Third New International Dictiouary (1961) 
These definitions show that a concentrate is a forn1 
of ore. The example (a) for the noun shows that it is a 
constitutent of "dressed ore.'' Exrunple ( 2) for the verb 
~hows that neither the first concentrating nor repeated 
concentratings change the 1naterial from' ·ore.'' 
Another definition of "ore" is: 
''Any material containing valuable metallic 
constitutents for the sake of which it is mined and 
worked.'' U.S. v. Cherokee Brick & Tile Crnn-
pany. 218 F. 2d 424, 425. 
This definition contemplates the ore "rill be ~~,,·orked'' 
or dressed and thus includes both raw and dressed ore. 
Ore "·as defined by the United States Supreme Court 
as: • 'The co1npound of a 1netal and some other substance, 
as oxygen, sulphur or arsenic, called its 1nineralizer, by 
w·hich its properties are disguised or lost." Marvel v. 
J/ e rritt, 116 U.S. 11, 29 L.Ed. 550, see also Ozark Chen~­
ical Co;HpaHy v. Jones, 125 F.2d 1, 2. Applying this defi-
nition, ore \\·as sold by defendants. At the ti1ne of sale 
the ore had been concentrated but neither smelted nor 
refined. Although later smelting and refining \vould 
eli1ninate the oxygen mineralizer, at the ti1ne of the sale 
h~· defendants to Uranium Reduction Company the min-
eralizPr ,,·as still present. There was still a compound of 
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uranium metal and oxygen, na1nely U308 , plus son1e re-
maining substances which had not been eli1ninated by the 
concentration process. 
In Yank v. Bordeaux, 23 Mont. 205, 58 P. 42, 45, the 
court said the "proceeds of the ore after milling'' were 
the "avails of the ore." The court "~as thereby referring 
to concentrated ore as "ore." 
(c) Parol ev.ide nee should not be considered. 
In the absence of ambiguity or uncertainty, the court 
must determine the intention of the parties fro1n the 
instru1ne.nt itself in accordance "·ith ordinary accepted 
meaning of the v.rords used. 
Oregon Short Line RR Co. 1·. Idalw Stockyards 
Co., 12 U. 2d 205, 364 P. 2d 826; 
Ephraim Theater Company 1/. Hau:k, 7 U. 2d 163, 
321 p. 2d 221. 
·The intent of parties to a contract should be ascer-
tained from the four corners of the instrument itself if 
unambiguous. Only if runbiguous are other contempor-
aneous writings concerning the same subject matter and 
extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions considered. 
Oregon Short Line RR Co. 'Z:. Idaho Stockya.rds 
Co., 12 U.2d 205, 364 P .2d 826 ; 
T.anner r. [Jtah Pou.lt~ry, 11 l 1.2d 353, 359 P.2d 18; 
Davis v. Payne & Day l nc., 10 lT.2d 53, 348 P.2d 
337; 
llf oody v. Snu·t 1l, 9 U.2d 139, 340 P. 2d 83; 
Hatch t:. Adanz.s, 8 1"'".2d 82, 329 P.2d 285: 
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Ephrahn Theater Co. v. Hawk, 7 U.2d 163, 321 
P. 2d 221; 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 U.2d 98, 
306 P. 2d 773; 
Starley r. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 lT. 577, 74 P.2d 
1221. 
As sho,vn by the above definitions in I (b), there is no 
ambiguity in the phrase ~~gross proceeds fron1 the sale 
of all ore.'' The royalt~- provision is expressly based 
upon proceeds of sale and the language expressly pro-
hibits deductions. 
(d) Processed ore can be the basis for royalty 
payments. 
The fact that the ore has been processed by concen-
trating does not preclude royalties from being based upon 
the processed ore p·rice. In State v. Northwest i'Jf agnesite 
Co., 28 Wash. 2d 1, 182 P. 2d 643, 648, the royalty was 
based upon the price received for processed (dead 
burned) magnesite where royalty was to be based on 
sales and the magnesite ore was treated before sale. 
(e) The language clearly supports plaintiffs' mo-
tion. 
Clearly, a "gross" and not a net royalty 'vas created. 
Clearly, the royalty is based upon ''proceeds from 
sale" rather than upon any indefinite "value'' which 
might vary according to the opinion of the p·erson setting 
it. 
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Clearly, ''ore'' is a broader term than either the 
lilnited terms ''raw,. ore'' or "dressed" or ''concentrated 
ore'' and therefore includes them. Only when the min-
eralizer, oxygen, has been elirninated does it cease to be 
ore. 
Because there is no arnbiguity, the court cannot con-
sider parol evidence whereby ''gross" could be changed 
to ''net" or "\Yherehy "proceeds of sale" could be changed 
to "value of ra"~ ore." 
The unambiguou~ language of the agreement is con-
clusive. The court's decision should have been based 
thereon and plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
should have been granted. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE GRANTING 
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
(a) The burden is upon the defendants to establish 
a rcord shouJing no issuf of fact. The theory underlying 
a motion for sun11na.ry judg1nent is closely akin to that 
underlying a rnotion for a directed verdict. The summary 
judgrnent procedure i~ not designed to supplant live 
trials where there i~ a genuine issue of material fact to be 
tried. The lo,ver court, on a 1notion for smnmary judg-
ment, should not resolve factual inferences, or other"~ise 
resolve an~· genuine 1naterial issue of fact. The party 
1noving for sunnnar~~ judgrnent has the burden of clearly 
establishing thP lack of a triable issue of fact upon a 
l'Peord that i~ adequatP to the legal issue presented. 6 
lll oo re ·s F cd era! Practice ~:3()-l-. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
(b) The record should be considered in a light nzost 
farorable to plaintiffs. 
For purpo~Ps of considering \vhether slunmary judg-
tnent should have been granted for defendants, the 
Supreme ( .. ourt should accept all of plaintiffs' allegations 
n1ade below as facts. 
Watkins v. Simonds, 11 U.2d 46, 35-t P.~d 852. 
The record should be considered in a light most 
favorable to p~laintiffs. 
Gantmon v. Federated Milk Producers Associa-
tion, 11 U .2d 421, 360 P .2d 1018. 
(c) The royalty provision is expressly based upon 
proceeds of sale and expressly prohibits ,deductions. 
This is fully covered under Point I. 
(d) There is no record on u,hich to nzodify the 
royalty provision. 
There is no record upon which to base any decision 
that the royalty language "gross proceeds from the sale 
of all ore" has any meaning other than its usual and 
ordinary meaning. 
It is not the province of the court to write a new 
agreement for the parties. Holbrook v. Webster's Inc. 7 
U.2d 1-tS, 320 P .2d 661 
Even if a contract is ill advised and burdensome, the 
court cannot make a new contract for the parties. 
Tooele C1ify v. l)ettle,meJZt Canyon Irrigation Co., 
-t lT. :Zd 215, 291 P. 2d 881. 
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At the very least, before the lower court directed deduc-
tions to be made fron1 a gross royalty provision or dir-
ected payments to be based upon value of ra"" ore instead 
of upon ''proceeds of sale" there 'vould have to be a 
record upon "~hich to base such a ruling. There is no evi-
dence, nor are there any admissions, affidavits or any 
other bases for the court's variation fro1n the express 
tenns of the gross royalty provision. 
(e) Rules of constr'ltction in the record support 
plaintiffs', not defendants' motion. 
If there "rere any ambiguity in the royalty language, 
the contract should be construed strictly against defend-
ants, for not only '\\ras the royalty agreen1ent drafted by 
defendants, it 'vas drafted by defendants' attorney (Tr. 
96, 121). 
Tauner t:. []talz Poultry, 11 lT. 2d 353, 359 P. 2d 18; 
Patterson 1·. W,ilcox, 11 1J.2d 264, 358 P. 2d 88; 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 U. 2d 
98, 306 p. 2d 773. 
(f) Parol Eridence in the recottd supports plain-
tiffs,' not defendants' m.otion. 
As shown in point I (c), parol evidence should not be 
considered. But even if there "~ere an1biguity in the 
royalty language, and it should be considered as to the 
meaning of "ore,'' the paro1 evidence in the record 
sho"~s that the sale of "'concentrates" is the sale of con-
centrated ore~ and that ''concentrates" are a fonn of ore. 
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The defendants thetnselves consider that concen-
trates are ore. The follo"?ing are specific instances in the 
record evidencing this : 
Hecla's sales records showing the actual sales of 
concentrated ore to URC on 'vhich plaintiffs claim their 
royalty should be based show '~total ore value," not Htotal 
concc ntrate value" ( Tr. 170). 
Federal in its fourth annual report showing income 
of its subsidiaries shows: 
Hlncotne Uraniurn Concentrate Ore Sales, 
$3,7 4-0,025." ( Tr. 58 (a) ). 
Federal Resources Corporation in its annual report 
of April 30, 1960, shows : 
'~4th. It tnust be remembered that there is 
no commercial stockpile of uranium. All of the 
ore mined an.d milled under government contract 
has been purchased for military use." (Tr. 62). 
Radorock Resources Inc. (merged into Federal) 1n 
its annual report of April 30, 1959, says: 
"Radon Mine ... A contract has been signed 
with the Uranium Reduction Company providing 
for a market for our ore through 1966." (Tr. 53) 
This reference is to the sales agreement under which 
plaintiffs claim royalties. 
In an affidavit by the president of defendant Federal 
Resources Corporation, he says : 
''Over 90% of the gross income of the corpo-
ration was for the fiscal year year ending April 
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30, 1960, realized from production of ores fron1 
mining p·roperties located in San Juan Countv. 
State of Utah." ( Tr. 96, 120). · · 
'
1 arious provisions in the custon1 1nilling agreement 
between defendants and Uranium Reduction Company 
show that defendants consider concentrated ore as ''ore," 
as follows: 
"O,vnership of ore in process," (Tr. 77 reverse side) 
as a heading indicates that it is ore during the processing 
as does also 
"owners recognize that the processes neces-
sary for concentration may require that ... proc-
essor co-mingle owners ore.'' ( Tr. 77, reverse 
side). 
"All risk of loss, theft or destruction of ore 
during or ... after the concentration process ... 
shall be on the owners," ( Tr 78) 
indicates that it is ore after the processing. 
A further indication that the sale "~as a sale of "'ore,. 
In a concentrated form, is the tax depletion treatment 
allO,YP(l the uranium industry, including defendants~ 
""hich treat~ milling as a part of mining. As previously 
Htated, this is not a situation in 'Yhich a finished product 
ha~ resulted fron1 the processing. l\Iilling is solely for 
the purpose of concentrating the ores. After the n1illing 
proeess the concentrated ores are smelted and refined un-
til a finished product results. Defendants have treated 
1nilling as still part of the process of 1nining ore in Inak-
ing their tax returns under 26 USC~\ 613. This act per-
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tnits the nune operator to take a depletion allo,vance 
ba::;ed upon "'the gross income from the property.'' This 
is defined as • 'the gross inc.ome from mining." The tern1 
''tnining" includes not merely the extraction of the ores 
or rninerals frorn the ground but also the "treatment 
processes considered as mining , '' including, in the case 
of uranium, "'crushing, grinding and beneficiation by 
concentration." The defendants are thus taking inconsist-
ent positions. For tax depletion they assert to the Gov-
erment that concentration of ore is just part of the mining 
process "~hereby ore is obtained, but to the royalty hold-
ers they assert that concentration is not a part of mining 
but is a process 'vhich completely changes the ore mined 
in to something else. 
(g) The co1trt erred 'tn granting defendants' 1notion. 
The court granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and thereby ruled, even without any evidence 
as to custo1n of the trade or any other parol evidence, 
that "ore" as used in the royalty provision could not 
n1ean processed ore, but as a matter of law 1neant only 
raw ore. 
This is erroneous for the following reasons: 
1. The general term "'ore" does include both of the 
more specific ter1ns ''raw ore'' and "concentrated ore.'' 
~. If that "\Vere not true, then at last the general 
term '"ore'' nti9ht include both of the more specific terms 
.. raw ore'' and hconcentrated ore." In such event there 
w·ould be t"vo possibilities: 
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(a) a construction of ''raw ore" would be avoided 
because if the royalty language were construed to mean 
"gross proceeds from the sale of raw ore," there would 
be conflicting provisions because, since 1958, defendants 
have chosen not to sell any raw ore. There therefore 
could be no "gross proceeds of sale.'' If effect can be 
given to both of two apparently conflicting provisions 
of a contract in a reasonable reconciliation, that inter-
pretation should control. 
Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 U. 2d 320, 266 
P. 2d 494. 
A construction of ''ore" as including concentrated ore 
eliminates the apparent conflict and should therefore be 
adopted, or 
(b) if that rule as to conflicting provisions were 
not followed, then a resort to parol evidence to solve an 
ambiguity "\vould necessitate a trial, thus precluding a 
summary judgment. 
POINT III. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE DECREE 
'THAT PLAINTIFFS RECOVER NOTHING BY THEIR SUIT. 
Regardless of the correctness of the court's ruling 
granting defendants' 1notion for summary judgn1~nt, the 
court's derree disn1issing plaintiffs' con1plaint \Yas erron-
eous. The basis upon \\Thich this accounting should be 
1nade \v·as only· one of the issues involved in the suit. 
Defendants' 1notion for sunnnary judgtnent related solely 
to the basis of sueh accounting. The determination by the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'27 
lower court as to the basis of the aecoun t ing did not there-
fore, adjudicate. all of the issues. X evertheless, the court, 
after granting defendants' 1notion for sunrmary judg-
Inent, \\?ent beyond the one issue thus adjudicated, and 
ruled that plaintiffs could recover nothing by their 
con1plaint. By this judgment plaintiffs have been de-
prived of any trial to establish : 
1. That uranium royalties even based upon the 
method of accounting prescribed by the lo\ver court have 
not been paid; 
2. That plaintiffs are entitled to royalties on vana-
dium which are admittedly contained "\\7ithin the ores 
produced and for which plaintiffs have not been p,aid; 
3. That part of the proceeds received by defend-
ants in selling the ore \Vas, in fact, a part of the sales 
price rather than a ~'development allowance" as contend-
ed by defendants, upon \vhich no royalty has been paid. 
V'l e consider these points in order: 
The first is self explanatory. 
The second involving failure to make royalty pay-
ments on vanadium is as follows : 
Plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting for, and 
payment of, their royalty based on the best sale price of 
all ore which defendants by using reasonable efforts 
might obtain. 2 Surnrners Oil & Gas par. 400. 
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Where, as here, the royalty is based upon the pro-
ceeds of sale, there is an implied obligation to market 
the production from the property. Townsend v. Creek-
more-Rooney Co., ______ Okla. ______ , 332 P. 2d 35. 
Defendants cannot rightfully give any of the pro-
duction a\vay, nor sell for a lo"\\rer price than is reason-
ably obtainable. 
Yet, in the milling agreement with URC, under "Thich 
defendants are now operating, there is a provision \\'"here-
by the gross proceeds could be \Yrongfully reduced. 
Plaintiff's seek an accounting as to \Yhether or not there 
has been such a wrongful reduction of gross proceeds, 
and if there has, plaintiffs seek a judgment for their 
royalty interest therein. The instance is as follows: 
By giving away the Vanadiun1 in exchange for a re-
duction in processing charge (lime penalty) defendants 
would have wrongfully reduced the gross price. The 
Custom Ivt:illing Agreement ( Tr. 77) provides that de-
fendants shall, until a "ne,w effective plant date,'' have an 
election to sell the contained vanadium for 31 cents per 
pound and pay an increased treat1nent charge, or give 
the vanadium a\Yay and pay no increased charge if ore 
contains In ore than 6 7o lin1e. After the '•ne\Y effective 
p1ant date" the vanadium is given a\vay in exchange for 
no increase in treat1nent charge regardless of the li1ne 
content of the ore. Plaintiffs seeks an accounting as to 
ho\v 1nuch vanadiu1n ha~ been sold at the 31 cents per 
pound price, since this is clearly a part of ''gross proceed~ 
of sale,~' and plaintiff~ are entitled to a judg1nent for 2% 
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of the price thereof if not already paid. 
On the other hand, if the vanadium was not sold for 
the 31 cents per pound, plaintiffs are entitled to an 
accounting as to ho\\T n1uch vanadiu1n has been given 
a"Tay, and to a judg1nent f'Or 2% of the value thereof, 
since defendants have an implied duty to sell the ore for 
the best price obtainable. 
The third p·oint involving deduction by defendants 
of a false~· developn1ent allo,vance'' is as follo\\Ts: 
The governn1ent, in buying ore through the .AEC, as 
a n1atter of public policy, paid to the miner 50 cents per 
pound of U308 as a develop·ment allowance ''in recognition 
of the expenditures necessary for 1naintaining and in-
ereasing developed reserves of uranium ores," ( Tr. 38), 
which was designed to be used by him to develop other ore 
bodies. This develop1nent allo,vance was expressly ex-
eluded from the gross sales price upon which royalties 
should be paid in the agreement providing for plaintiffs' 
royalty (Tr. 49). 
The public policy of the AEC to develop more sources 
of fissionable material is inapplicable where a sale is 
made to a private buyer such as lTRC. An)T payment 
made by a private buyer is part of the purchase price, 
regardless of any subterfuge such as ear1narking part 
thereof as an "allo,vance.'' But, instead of showing the 
true gross sales price, defendants drafted their sales 
agreement with the private buyer UR;C to deduct from 
the total sales price a fictitious ~~ develop·ment allo\\Tance" 
on 'vhich no royalty \Ya~ paid (Tr. 88). 
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Indicative of the fact that there is no separate 
"policy'' on the part of a private buyer to develop more 
fissionable material is the fact that the sales agreement 
with URC provides that when the government stops pay-
ing a development allowance (upon the expiration of 
Circular 5 on ~1:arch 31, 1962) the fictitious allowance 
from lJRC ceases and the full payment of $8.00 per pound 
is sho,vn as sales price. ( Tr. 88 reverse side) If there 
were any reason for a private buyer to pay a development 
allowance, it would not be affected by the government's 
elimination of its allowance. The most that can be said 
for a development allowance deduction is that if the sale 
had been 1nade to the government the government would 
have paid an allo,vance. That is no reason to 1nake dedue-
tions fro1n gross sales price ·w·hen a sale is made p-rivate-
ly. Plaintiffs seek an accounting and judgment for its 
share of the true gross proceeds ""'ithout a deduction of 
any artificial 50 cent per pound development allowance. 
But not only have defendants created the fiction of a 
"develop1nent allowance" in sales to a private buyer, the 
development allowance 'vas actually raised even higher 
than that paid by the government. The government paid 
50 cents (Tr. 38) but defendants and l"'"RC made it 54 
cents, and thus arrive at a $7.46 "sales price'' instead of 
a true $8.00 pe-r pound (Tr. 88) This adds insult to in-
jury·. If defendants can increase the allow·ance 4 cents, 
why couldn't it be increased 6 cents, 10 cents or any larger 
portion of the $8.00? 
Plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting and judgment 
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for not only· the 50 cents but also the extra -1: cents per 
pound. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE ROYALTY PRO-
VISION A DIFFER.ENT EFFEICT FOR PAST AND FUT·URE 
ROYALTIES. 
The Court held that, if plaintiffs did not like the 
royalties based on ra\v ore value, .Zn the fut-ure only 
plaintiffs might elect to have the royalty based upon the 
net proceeds of sale actually received, after deducting 
1nilling costs. If, despite the royalty provision language 
of ~'gross," not "net'' royalty, plaintiffs have to choose 
between these two alternatives, it is better from a tax 
depletion standpoint to have the accounting based upon 
net proceeds rather than raw ore values, inasmuch as 
plaintiffs could get a portion of the benefit of a greater 
depletion allo"\\rance. To date, defendants have had the 
benefit of all of the increased depletion allowance. De-
fendants have not just depleted the "working interest" 
portion of the proceeds, but have depleted that portion 
of the increase in sales price of the ore attributable 
to plaintiffs' 2% royalty, since it has depleted 100% of 
the gross proceeds of sale, less "raw ore value" royalty 
payments (Tr. 43, 92). The court, with no basis for dif-
ferentiation between past and future royalties, (the 
royalty agreement does not change) held that the duty 
of the defendants to account on the net actual sales p~rice 
basis, which is by far the better of the two poor alter-
natives given plaintiffs, ap-plies only to future sales. 
The least the court could have done, in order to be con-
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sistent, is to hold the royalty provision means one thing 
or the other fron1 its inception, rather than changing its 
construction only for future production. 
CONCLUSION 
Technical rules of construction need not be applied 
In this case. The plain, clear language of the royalty 
provision is "gross proceeds from the sale of all ore.,~ 
Because the language is unambiguous, parol evidence 
must not be considered. The language expressly bases 
royalties upon proceeds of sale, and expressly prohibits 
deductions. Plaintiffs' motion that the royalties should 
be so based should therefore have been granted. 
~The court rejected the language of the royalty pro-
vision, and instead gave plaintiffs two alternatives: 
Plaintiffs could either, 1-take the value of ra'Y ore, or 
2-take the net proceeds of sale. Both alternatives vio-
late the clear provisions set forth in the royalty agree-
ment. The first disregards the "\vords "proceeds of sale"; 
the second disregards the 'vord "gross" and gives it an 
exactly opposite 1neaning of "net." There ,,~as no record 
whatsoever in support of such a construction, even if 
the court had been justified in looking beyond the lan-
guage of the agree1nent. Even the parol evidence in the 
record supports plaintiffs' n1otion rather than defend-
ants'. 
It is not the provinee of the court tb "'Tite a ne"-
agreeinent for the partie~. Defendant Federal Resouree~ 
(~orporation i~ hardly an un~ophi~ticated 1niner 'yho 
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1night not have kno"·n the precise 1neaning of 'vords used 
in ereating a royalty· interest. \Vhen some confusion ex-
isted in the chain of title as to whether there was a" net 
1nill or s1nelter return" or a ~'gross proceeds of sale" 
royalty, defendants' corporate counsel \vrote an agree-
Inent expressly stating that the royalty should be based 
on gross proceeds. A lawyer would intend the words to 
1nean preci~ely what they said; that a gross royalty 
~hould be created. If he had intended a net royalty to be 
ereated \Yhere by 1nilling or other costs should be deducted 
from the gross, he \vould have said so and would have 
specified what deductions should be 1nade. 
The court based the judg~nent on his own observa-
tions of copper mining rather than upon any record. 
Its ruling was based entirely on the court's concept that 
''concentrates" are not ore. This ignores the dictionary 
definitions and defendants' own use of the words indicat-
ing otherwise. After so construing the word "ore" the 
court then completely ignored all of the other words, 
''gross proceeds of sale." A correct construction would 
have reconciled all the provisions. 
The summary judgment also differentiates between 
past and future royalties, creating a situation in \vhich 
defendants are entitled to all of the increase in depletion 
allo"Tance in the past and permitting plaintiffs to take 
its pro-rata share of the increased depletion allowance 
only in the future. Such differentiation has no basis, in 
that the same royalty provision controls both past and 
future royalties. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
Not only did the court err in the construction of the 
royalty provision, it went beyond the scope of the n1otion 
for summary judgrnent. The 1notion merely sought de-
termination of the basis upon which an accoWlting should 
be made, but the court adjudicated that plaintiffs were 
not entitled to any accounting whatsoever. The court 
thereby deprived plaintiffs of their day in court to as-
certain whether or not they had all the uranium royalties 
to which they were entitled, (even upon defendants' con-
struction of the royalty provision) and to ascertain 
the amount of vanadium royalties to which they "l"ere 
entitled, and to ascertain whether or not that which de-
fendants contend is development allowance, not subject 
to a royalty, was in fact a part of the purchase price to 
which plaintiffs' royalty would apply. 
We submit that error "~as committed and that the 
judgment should be reversed and an accounting be or-
dered based upon the language of the royalty provision. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
DELANEY & BALCO~IB 
and 
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY 
1001 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants. 
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